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TRAVELLING THE NATIONAL ROUTE: SOUTH AFRICA’S PROTECTION OF 
INVESTMENT ACT 2015 
 
TARCISIO GAZZINI* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This note examines the main features of the South African Protection of Investment Act 2015 
(hereinafter the ‘Act’),1 promulgated in January 2016, and provides a preliminary assessment 
on its adequacy to protect foreign investment, taking into account existing customary 
international law and investment treaties. It is worth recalling that the adoption of the Act was 
the culmination of a process aimed at reconsidering the South African approach to the 
protection of foreign investment. The process started with a three-year review of the bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) concluded by South Africa and their impact on both economic 
growth and regulatory powers. 2  The results of the review were published in 2009 3  and 
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1 At https://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/39514.pdf. All websites visited last time on 18 
August 2017. 
2 As pointed out by the UN Economic Commission for Africa, Committee on Regional 
Cooperation and Integration, Investment agreements landscape in Africa, 7–9 December 
2015, at http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-
documents/RITD/2015/CRCI-Oct2015/report-on-investment-agreements.pdf, p. 1, 
‘[t]he impact of bilateral investment treaties on economic and social development in 
Africa remains debatable. There is no conclusive evidence regarding the effect of these 
treaties on foreign investment.’ Several authors, including L. Cotula, X. Weng, Q. Ma 
and P. Ren, China-Africa Investment Treaties: Do they Work? (International Institute 
for Environment and Development, 2016): 51, at 
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17588IIED.pdf, have argued that ‘[t]here is a strong case for 
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revealed that ‘the current system had opened the door for narrow commercial interests to 
subject matters of vital national interest to unpredictable international arbitration that may 
constitute direct challenges to legitimate, constitutional and democratic policy-making.’4 At 
the international level, the government of South Africa has terminated nine BITs with 
European countries (Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg Economic Union, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), thus reducing 
the number of BITs in force to 14, according to the UNCTAD database.5 The fact that only 
BITs with European countries were terminated was described as incidental due to their 
expiration dates.6 More BITs are reportedly in the process of termination.7 
                                                                                                                                                                             
African governments to conduct rigorous reviews of the performance of their 
investment treaties, including both costs and benefits.’ 
3 South Africa Department of Trade and Industry, Bilateral Investment Policy Framework 
Review, General Notice 961, Government Gazette 32386 (7 July 2009). 
4 X. Carim, ‘Lessons from South Africa’s BITs review’, VALE Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, No. 109, 25 November 2013, at 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No_109_-_Carim_-_FINAL.pdf. See also R. 
Davies, Minister of Trade and Industry, 2007 UNCTAD’s Investment Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development in Geneva, at 
http://www.dti.gov.za/delegationspeechdetail.jsp?id=2506. 
5 Russian Federation, Nigeria, South Korea, Cuba, China, Mauritius, Argentina, Iran, 
Senegal, Greece, Sweden, Finland, Italy and Zimbabwe. See 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org.  
6 See Department of Trade and Industry, Responses to Submissions, 16 September 2015, 
at 
http://www.samed.org.za/Filemanager/userfiles/Promotion%20and%20Protection%20of
%20Investment%20Bill%20%20Department%20response%20to%20submissions%20.p
df. 
7 According to an unofficial list provided by South Africa’s Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation as per 12 February 2016 (on file with author), notice of 
termination was given by South Africa with regard to the BITs with Italy, Greece, Cuba 
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At the domestic level, a draft of the investment act was published in October 2013 and 
open to public comment. It ignited a hot debate between the government and the different 
stakeholders.8 The bill was then formally introduced in the National Assembly on 22 July 
2015 under the title ‘Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill’ and eventually 
promulgated in the final form on 15 December under the final title which dropped the 
reference to ‘promotion’. It consists of 16 articles (including the last three on practical matters 
and transitional arrangements) and its structure is broadly modelled after traditional BITs, 
although it presents macroscopic differences compared to them, both substantially and 
procedurally. 
 
II. CONTENT OF THE ACT 
A. Definition of Investment 
The Act contains a rather sophisticated definition of investment composed of three categories. 
Under Section 2.1, an investment is: 
(a) any lawful enterprise established, acquired or expanded by an investor in 
accordance with the laws of the Republic, committing resources of economic 
value over a reasonable period of time, in anticipation of profit; 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and Finland. On South African investment treaty practice and policy, see E. C. 
Schlemmer, ‘An overview of South Africa’s bilateral investment treaties and investment 
policy’, 31 ICSID Review (2016): 167–93. 
8 Among the numerous reactions, see European Union Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in Southern Africa, ‘The promotion and protection of Investment Bill 2013’, 
August 2015, at 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/55f93ec2e4b0d99faf1aef57/t/56091fcce4b08574a5
b910be/1443438540876/EU+Chamber+of+Commerce_Parliamentary+Submission_Inv
estment+Bill_Shorter_ . . .pdf. 
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(b) the holding or acquisition of shares, debentures or other ownership instruments 
of such an enterprise; or 
(c) the holding, acquisition or merger by such an enterprise with another enterprise 
outside the Republic to the extent that such holding, acquisition or merger with 
another enterprise outside the Republic, has an effect on an investment 
contemplated by paragraphs (a) and (b) in the Republic. 
Category (a) is reminiscent of the so-called Salini test, based on three elements of the notion 
of investment, namely ‘contributions, certain duration of performance of the contract and a 
participation in the risks of the transaction’. 9  Interestingly, no mention is made of the 
contribution to the development of the host state, which some arbitral tribunals have 
considered as an additional requirement for the purpose of the definition of investment.10 
Section 2.2 further provides a comprehensive but non-exhaustive list of assets. The 
term ‘assets’, which is presumably used here as synonymous with ‘resources’ under section 
2.1, includes: (a) shares, stocks, debentures, securities or other equity instruments of the 
enterprise or another enterprise; (b) a debt security of another enterprise; (c) loans to an 
enterprise; (d) movable or immovable property or other property rights such as mortgages, 
liens or pledges; (e) claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial 
value; (f) copyrights, know how, goodwill or intellectual property rights such as patents, 
trademarks, industrial designs and trade names; (g) returns such as profits, dividends, 
royalties or income yielded by an investment; or (h) rights or concessions conferred by law or 
under contract, including licences to cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources. 
                                                        
9 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco, ICSID ARB/00/4, 
Jurisdiction, 31 July 2001, para. 52 in fine. 
10 See, for instance, Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Egypt, ICSID ARB/05/19, 
Jurisdiction, 17 October 2006, para. 77. 
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The Act does not contain any precise definition of investor. Instead, section 1 
laconically defines it in a rather circular manner as an enterprise making an investment. The 
definition of investor is completed by that of ‘enterprise’, which clarifies that the Act protects 
both natural and legal persons, regardless of their incorporation in South Africa. Since 
nationality is irrelevant for the purpose of the substantive protection granted under the Act, 
there seems to be no need for a definition of investor similar to those that can be found in 
investment treaties. However, the nationality of foreign investors is relevant for the purpose 
of international arbitration between South Africa and the home state, even if such mechanism 
– whose recourse has been rather exceptional in foreign investment law –is not mandatory 
under section 13(5) of the Act. 
 
B. General Provisions 
The Act’s aims are threefold as enunciated in section 4. First, it purports to protect investment 
in accordance with and subject to the Constitution, with a view to striking a balance between 
the rights and interests of the different stakeholders. Second, it affirms and safeguards the 
sovereign right of South Africa to regulate investments in the public interest. Third, it 
confirms the application to all investments made in South Africa of the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution as well as of all relevant laws. 
Section 3 of the Act, which deals with the interpretation of the Act, is an intriguing 
provision. It provides that the Act must be interpreted and applied in accordance with its 
purposes, the Constitution – including the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, customary 
international law and international law, governed respectively in sections 39, 232 and 233 of 
the Constitution – as well as relevant international treaties to which South Africa is or 
becomes a party. 
Section 39 (Interpretation of Bill of Rights) reads: 
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1. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must 
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
2. When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.11 
Section 232 deals with the legal status of customary international law in the South African legal 
system and establishes that customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
Interestingly, section 3 of the Act does not contain any reference to section 231.4 of 
the Constitution, the equivalent for international treaties of section 232. Section 231.4 states 
that international treaties become law in the Republic when enacted into law by national 
legislation, whereas self-executing provisions contained in international treaties approved by 
the Parliament are considered as law of the Republic, provided they are not inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of the Parliament. 
According to section 233, finally, when interpreting any legislation, South African 
courts must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with it. 
The Act applies to all investments falling within the definition of section 2, or, using 
the terminology of section 5 of the Act, ‘to all investments made in accordance with the 
requirements set out in Section 2’. It also provides that all investments must be established in 
accordance with domestic law (section 7.1) and clearly excludes any pre-establishment rights 
(section 7.2). 
                                                        
11 Emphasis added. 
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C. Substantive Rules 
The catalogue of provisions on investment protection of the Act is limited to five. Under 
section 6, the government must ensure that ‘administrative, legislative and judicial processes 
do not operate in a manner that is arbitrary or that denies administrative and procedural 
justice’ to investors in accordance with the Constitution and relevant legislation. In spite of 
the absence of any reference to fairness apart from fair public hearing before a court, the 
section is titled ‘Fair administrative treatment’ (without any mention of administrative and 
judicial treatment).  
The standard embodied in section 6, which did not appear in the draft submitted in 
July, is essentially national and based on the prohibition of arbitrary treatment and on denial 
of administrative and procedural justice as provided in domestic legislation. It is then further 
substantiated by three renvois to Articles 32 to 34 of the Constitution, concerning, 
respectively, the right to be given written reasons and administrative review, the right to 
access to government-held information and the right to a fair public hearing before a court or 
another independent and partial tribunal or forum. 
Reminiscent of the so-called Calvo doctrine, 12  section 8.1 (National treatment) 
provides that foreign investors cannot be treated less favourably than domestic investors in 
like circumstances. Section 8.2 offers a non-exhaustive list of elements that have to be taken 
into account in order to establish the existence of ‘like circumstances’, such as (a) the effect 
of the foreign investment on the Republic and the cumulative effects of all investments; (b) 
the sector that the foreign investments are in; (c) the aim of any measure relating to foreign 
                                                        
12  On the clause, see, in particular, C. Schreuer, ‘Calvo’s grandchildren: the return of local 
remedies in investment arbitration’, 4 Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals (2005): 1–17. 
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investments; (d) factors relating to the foreign investor or the foreign investment in relation to 
the measure concerned; (e) the effect on third persons and the local community; (f) the effect 
on employment; and (g) the direct and indirect effect on the environment. 
Yet, the scope of application of the national treatment is significantly reduced by the 
express exclusion of the extension to foreign investors of preferences or privileges resulting, 
inter alia, from (a) government procurement processes; (b) public subsidies and grants; (c) the 
promotion of equality or advancement of historically disadvantaged persons, promotion of 
cultural heritage, indigenous knowledge and related biological resources, or national heritage; 
and (d) the assistance for or development of small and medium businesses or new industries 
(section 8.4). 
Under section 9 South Africa must ensure the physical security of foreign investors ‘as 
may be generally provided to domestic investors in accordance with minimum standard of 
treatment of customary international law (MSCIL) and subject to available resources and 
capacity’. 
The Act contains a section reminiscent of, yet significantly different from the other 
key provision normally found in investment treaties, namely expropriation. Section 10 of the 
Act confines itself to extending to foreign investors the right to property protected under 
section 25 of the Constitution, a rather complex provision of more than 350 words.13 Section 
                                                        
13 Section 25 (Property) reads:  
1. No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 2. Property may be expropriated only in 
terms of law of general application (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and (b) 
subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which 
have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 3. The amount 
of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, 
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, 
having regard to all relevant circumstances, including (a) the current use of the property; (b) 
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25 indicates, inter alia, the requirements that are to be satisfied in the case of expropriation: 
(a) no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application; (b) no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property; (c) property may be expropriated only for a 
public purpose or in the public interest, which includes land reform and equitable access to all 
South Africa’s natural resources; and (d) expropriation entails the obligation to pay just and 
equitable compensation fixed, in case of disagreement, by a domestic court and reflecting an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard 
to all relevant circumstances. 
Section 25 of the Constitution further clarifies, inter alia, that the state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the history of the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) 
the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property; and (e) the purpose of the expropriation. 4. For the purposes of 
this section (a) the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources; and (b) 
property is not limited to land. 5. The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain 
access to land on an equitable basis. 6. A person or community whose tenure of land is legally 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable 
redress. 7. A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of 
past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 8. No provision of this 
section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, 
water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided 
that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of 
section 36(1). 9. Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6). 
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which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis, and that nothing in section 
9 prevents the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and 
related reform in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination. 
The final substantive provision relates to the right of foreign investors to repatriate 
funds, subject to taxation and other applicable legislation (section 11). 
 
D. Right to Regulate 
A key provision of the Act is section 12 (Right to regulate) providing in paragraph 1 that 
nothing in the Act precludes the adoption by the government, in accordance with the 
Constitution and applicable legislation, of measures concerning, inter alia: (a) redressing 
historical, social and economic inequalities and injustices; (b) upholding the basic values and 
principles governing the public administration; (c) upholding the rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution; (d) promoting and preserving cultural heritage and practices, indigenous 
knowledge and biological resources related thereto, or national heritage; (e) fostering 
economic development, industrialisation and beneficiation; (f) achieving the progressive 
realisation of socio-economic rights; or (g) protecting the environment and the conservation 
and sustainable use of natural resources. 
Furthermore, under paragraph 2 of section 12, the government or any organ of state 
may take measures that are necessary to comply with international obligations related to 
international peace and security, or the protection of security interests, including the financial 
stability of the Republic. 
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E. Procedural Provisions 
With regard to the settlement of disputes between the investor and the government, the Act 
makes available to the former two types of domestic remedies. Within six months of 
‘becoming aware of the dispute’, the investor may request the Department of Trade and 
Industry (TDI) ‘to facilitate the resolution of such dispute by appointing a mediator’ (section 
13.1). Under section 13.2, the mediator is appointed by the government and the investor from 
a list maintained by the DTI, or in the absence of such a list from individuals proposed by 
either party. If the DTI is party to the dispute, the parties may jointly request the Judge 
President of one of the divisions of the High Court to appoint a mediator. 
Alternatively, under section 13.4 and subject to applicable legislation, an investor, 
upon becoming aware of a dispute, ‘is not precluded from approaching any competent court, 
independent tribunal or statutory body within the Republic for the resolution of a dispute 
relating to an investment.’ 
The Act also foresees the possibility of arbitration between South Africa and the 
national state of the investor in respect of investments covered by this Act. In this case, the 
government may consent to international arbitration, subject to the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. In considering such a request, the government must respect the administrative 
processes set out in section 6 of the Act (Fair and administrative treatment). 
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III. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ACT 
The Act is a strong response to the perceived inadequacy of investment treaties which have 
attracted growing criticism for three main reasons. 14  First and in spite of some recent 
interesting developments and with significant exceptions,15 these treaties remain manifestly 
unbalanced in favour of the investor, to the point that in Spyridon v. Romania, the Tribunal 
candidly admitted that the BIT between Greece and Romania ‘imposes no obligation on 
investors, only on contracting States’.16 Second, investment treaties are often perceived by the 
host state as unduly restricting its regulatory powers and its capacity to pursue its social and 
economic policies. Third, investment arbitration is not considered as offering adequate 
guarantees in terms of legitimacy, transparency and coherence. 
The disaffection for investment treaties, combined with the lack of clear evidence that 
investment treaties increase the flow of foreign investments and stimulate economic growth,17 
has pushed several states to reconsider their approach to the legal protection of such 
                                                        
14 For a balanced assessment of these treaties, see G. Van Harten, ‘Five justifications for 
investment treaties: a critical discussion’, 2 Trade Law and Development (2010): 1–32. 
15 See, for example, Supplementary Act Adopting Community Rules on Investment and 
the Modalities for its Implementation within ECOWAS, 19 December 2008, at 
http://www.privatesector.ecowas.int/en/III/Supplementary_Act_Investment.pdf; or the 
BIT concluded between Morocco and Nigeria on 3 December 2016 (not yet in force), 
see T. Gazzini, ‘Nigeria and Morocco move towards a “new generation” of bilateral 
investment treaties’, EJIL Talk!, May 2017, http://www.ejiltalk.org. 
16 Spyridon v. Romania, ICSID ARB/06/1, Award, 7 December 2011, para. 871. 
17 UNCTAD, The Impact of International Investment Agreements on Foreign Direct 
Investment: An Overview of Empirical Studies 1998–2014, Issues Note, Working Draft, 
September 2014, available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/unctad-web-diae-pcb-2014-
Sep%2024.pdf. 
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investments. States are increasingly reluctant to conclude new BITs.18 Some states have opted 
for a revision of their treaty models with a view to striking a better balance between the rights 
and obligations of the host state and foreign investors, to properly preserving the policy space 
of the latter and to revising the remedies available to the investor, with the possible express 
provision for counter-claims put forward by states.19 Other states have preferred to conclude 
facilitation agreements which radically downgrade the substantive protection of foreign 
investment and do not provide for judicial or arbitral proceedings against the host state.20 
The South African government has opted for a different route based on the assumption 
that domestic legislation is more appropriate than international legal instruments to regulate 
foreign investment. 
The Act is firmly anchored to the Constitution, as is evident first in sections 3 and 4. 
The first section indicates that it must be interpreted, inter alia, in accordance with the 
Constitution. The second enunciates its objectives and subsection (a) eloquently provides that 
foreign investments are to be protected ‘in accordance with and subject to the Constitution’. 
The Act also contains several references and renvois to the Constitution, most prominently 
with regard to section 6 (Fair administrative treatment), Section 10 (Right to property) and 
Section 12 (Right to regulate). 
The choice to move away from international treaties in favour to a domestic piece of 
legislation solidly pegged to the Constitution is an interesting compromise. Domestic 
                                                        
18 Only 25 BITs have entered into force since 1 January 2014. 
19 See, most notably, the new Indian BIT model, at 
http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/investment_division/ModelBIT_Anne
x.pdf. See also the 2016 BIT between Morocco and Nigeria, supra, note 15. 
20 See, for example, Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Treaties (CFITs) recently 
concluded by Brazil and Mozambique, at 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.%20php?option=com_content&view=article&id=85
11&catid=42&Itemid=280&lang=pt-BR. 
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legislation unavoidably exposes foreign investors to greater risks and instability as the 
legislator may at any time amend the legal rules whereas modifying a treaty requires the 
agreement of all parties. Pegging the Act to the Constitution, however, significantly mitigates 
such exposure due to the rigidity of the Constitution, which can be modified only in 
accordance with a more complex procedure.21 Yet the Acts and the Constitution itself make 
several references to other pieces of domestic legislation, thus paving the way to the 
‘ordinary’ legislative intervention to complete and elaborate on the rules contained in the Act 
and the Constitution. It is also possible that the consistency of the ordinary legislation with the 
Constitution is disputed. Here the risks foreign investors are exposed to become more 
important. 
With regard to the substantive provisions, the Act does not impose any new 
obligations upon the investor. The only obligation expressly mentioned in the Act is the 
obligation to comply with domestic law, which needless to say exists regardless of any 
express provision.22 From this perspective the legislator has preferred to include in the Act 
several references to domestic legislation rather than to insert in the Act any obligations for 
the investors like those that have slowly found their way into investment treaties, such as 
obligations on transparency, access to documents, consultation, corporate social 
responsibility, corruption or social and environmental impact assessment.23 
                                                        
21 See section 74 (Bills amending the Constitution). 
22  In Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, ICSID ARB/05/8, Award, 11 September 
2007, para. 332, for instance, the Tribunal pointed out that ‘[i]t is each State’s 
undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sovereign legislative power. A State has 
the right to enact, modify or cancel a law at its own discretion.’ 
23 See, for instance, Chapter III of ECOWAS Supplementary Act on Foreign Investment, 
or the 2016 BIT between Morocco and Nigeria, supra, note 15. 
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Moving to the catalogue of provisions protecting foreign investors contained in the 
Act, the key provision on fair administrative treatment (section 6) is significantly different 
from the fair and equitable treatment (FET) normally found in investment treaties.24 FET is a 
rather vague international standard that investment tribunals have progressively shaped 
through a largely consistent body of decisions.25 As pointed out by a tribunal, the standard: 
 
encompasses inter alia the following concrete principles: the State must act in a 
transparent manner; the State is obliged to act in good faith; the State’s conduct cannot 
be arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust, idiosyncratic, discriminatory, or lacking in due 
process; the State must respect procedural propriety and due process. The case law 
also confirms that to comply with the standard, the State must respect the investor’s 
reasonable and legitimate expectations.26 
 
                                                        
24 See, for instance, Article 3.1 of the BIT between South Africa and China, according to 
which: 
 
 Investments and activities associated with investments of investors of either Contracting 
Party shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way 
impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of investors of the other 
Contracting Party. 
 
25 As pointed out in Total S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/04/01), Liability, 27 December 
2010, para. 109: ‘[T]ribunals have endeavoured to pinpoint some typical obligations 
that may be included in the standard, as well as types of conduct that would breach the 
standard, in order to be guided in their analysis of the issue before them.’ 
26 Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil TelekomunikasyonHizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, 
ICSID ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008, para. 609. 
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Such concrete principles are regularly recognised and applied by the generality of states 
within their respective jurisdictions as well as by international arbitral tribunals. 
The standard contained in section 6 of the Act, on the contrary, does not go much 
further than confirming the protection granted to investment in the Constitution. It does not 
make any express reference to non-discriminatory measures presumably in order to avoid any 
risk of restricting the regulatory powers of South Africa, especially with regard to the 
implementation of policies aimed at correcting past discriminatory measures.27 
The distinction between arbitrary measures (or ‘arbitrary deprivation of property’ 
using the wording of Article 25 of the Constitution) and discriminatory measures has emerged 
sufficiently clearly in international law and in foreign investment law in particular.28 The 
former category possesses a manifestly negative connotation since arbitrary measures inflict 
damage on the foreign investor without serving a legitimate purpose,29 or bear ‘no rational 
relationship [. . .] between a measure adopted by the government and the alleged purpose or 
goal of that measure’. 30  Relying on both ICJ jurisprudence 31  and dictionaries, several 
                                                        
27 It is worth noting that BITs concluded by South Africa normally prohibit unreasonable 
or discriminatory measures; see, for instance, Article 41.1 of the BIT with China, 
Article 4.1 of the BIT with Nigeria and Article 3.1 of the BIT with Argentina. 
28 The Expropriation Bill adopted in 2015 aims at ensuring that ‘expropriation does not 
take place arbitrarily and takes place only for a public purpose or in the public interest’ 
(section 2.1), at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/b4-2015_150213_edited.pdf. 
In the literature, see C. Schreuer, ‘Protection against arbitrary or discriminatory 
measures’, in R. P. Alford and C. A. Rogers (eds), The Future of Investment Arbitration 
(Oxford University Press, 2009): 183, with reference to some arbitral decisions in 
footnote 60.  
29 Ibid., especially p. 198.  
30 P. Dumberry, ‘The prohibition against arbitrary conduct and the fair and equitable 
treatment standard under NAFTA Article 1105’, 15 Journal of World Investment and 
Trade (2014): 117–51, at 122–3. According to UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable 
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investment tribunals have described arbitrary measures or means as ‘derived from mere 
opinion’, ‘capricious’, ‘unrestrained’, ‘despotic’, ‘fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure’, 
‘without adequate determining principle’, ‘depending on the will alone’, ‘without cause based 
upon the law’.32 In a similar vein, the South Africa Constitutional Court has held that a 
conduct is arbitrary when ‘capricious or proceeding merely from the will and not based on 
reason or principle’.33 
The choice made in section 6 to not expressly refer to discriminatory conduct is of 
great importance from the standpoint of the exercise of regulatory powers by South Africa. 
South African authorities may adopt measures having – probably de facto – discriminatory 
nature, but not amounting to arbitrariness, in pursuing their public policies, including those 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Treatment (2012) p. 78, arbitrary measures are ‘derived from mere opinion’, 
‘capricious’, ‘unrestrained’, ‘despotic’ or ‘founded on prejudice or preference rather 
than on reason or fact’. 
31 In Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15, at p. 76, the 
Court described an arbitrary conduct as ‘wilful disregard of due process of law, an act 
which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety’. In the Colombian-
Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 266, at p. 284, it was held that 
‘[a]rbitrary action is substituted for the rule of law. Such would be the case if the 
administration of justice were corrupted by measures clearly prompted by political 
aims.’ 
32  See, for instance, Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/02/8, Award, 17 January 
2007, para. 318. In Methanex v. United States, Award, 3 August 2005, Part IV, Chapter 
B, para. 1, the Tribunal referred to ‘malign intent’. On the application of the notion of 
arbitrariness, see, in particular, V. Heiskanen, ‘Arbitrary and unreasonable measures’, in 
A. Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford University Press, 2008): 
87; J. Stone, ‘Arbitrariness, the fair and equitable treatment standard and the 
international law of investment’, 25 Leiden Journal of International Law (2012): 77. 
33 Beckingham v. Boksburg Liquor Licencing Board 1931 TPD 280, at 282, and 
Johannesburg Liquor Licencing Board v. Kuhn 1963 (4) SA 666 (A), at 671C. 
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intended to redress the consequences of past discriminatory measures, to promote the well-
being of historically disadvantaged categories or to implement land reform. From this 
perspective, section 6 must be read together not only with the relevant parts of the 
Constitution and the 2015 Expropriation Bill, but also with section 9 of the Constitution and 
section 12 of the Act on the power to regulate. 
It is true that section 6 requires South Africa to ensure administrative and procedural 
justice. Such a requirement, however, relates to access to the competent tribunals or other 
bodies as well as the proper administration of justice. Yet, it may be argued that such a 
requirement does not undermine measures adopted by public authorities to pursue public 
policies, even if they may be discriminatory against foreign investors, provided that the later 
have access to justice and justice is properly administered. 
The national treatment standard contained in section 8 is in principle comparable with 
that guaranteed by investment treaties, if not for its source.34 The innovative element is the 
detailed yet non-exhaustive list of elements to be taken into account to determine the 
existence of ‘like circumstances’, which appears to be well articulated and may be expected 
not only to facilitate the application of the Act, but also to enhance the predictability and 
consistency of the related judicial and arbitral decisions. 
The specifications in section 8.4, however, water the standard down by carving out 
broadly worded exceptions to the extension to foreign investors of the treatment reserved to 
                                                        
34 Article 10(1) of the BIT with China, for instance, provides that: 
 
 If the treatment to be accorded by one Contracting Party in accordance with its laws and 
regulations to investments or activities associated with such investments of investors of 
the other Contracting Party is more favourable than the treatment provided for in this 
Agreement, the more favourable treatment shall be applicable. 
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domestic investors. In spite of the apparent close character of the list of exceptions, section 
8.4 leaves the government great room for manoeuvre, especially when it comes to promoting 
the achievement of equality, cultural heritage and practices or developing small, medium or 
new industries. 
The policy space of the government is further safeguarded by section 12 on the right 
to regulate, this time with a non-comprehensive list of categories of measures. It must be 
noted that these measures do not need to be necessary to protect certain social interests – such 
as the environment or public health. They allow a proactive role for South Africa and their 
general nature makes it difficult for investors to obtain any administrative or judicial control 
beyond compliance with the procedural guarantees contained in section 6 of the Act as well as 
the principles of good faith, proportionality and reasonableness.  
While it is certainly legitimate to ensure that the host state is able to exercise its rights 
and fulfil its duties,35  the combination of sections 8.4 and 12 substantially weakens the 
protection of foreign investments. One may wonder whether a more balanced approach could 
be inspired by provisions contained in existing BITs, such as the Article 3(3)(c) BIT between 
South Africa and the Czech Republic (not in force yet), which excludes foreign investors 
                                                        
35 As pointed out with regard to investment treaties by the Commonwealth Investment 
Experts Group Meeting for the African Region, ‘Summary Record’, Kampala, 20–21 
October 2011: 
  
 One common issue is the need to clarify the interaction between international 
investment instruments and domestic investment policy as well as policy in other 
areas – for e.g., sustainable development and environmental regulation. Governments 
must always be concerned about ensuring that there is sufficient policy space for them 
to engage in reconciling competing interests. 
(http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/files/243514/FileName/FINALIEGOutcomesS
ummary%282%29.pdf) 
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from the enjoyment of any treatment preference or privilege which may be granted by the 
host state in relation to ‘any law or other measure the purpose of which is to promote the 
achievement of equality in its territory, or designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’.36 
Section 9 on the legal protection of property is not particularly well drafted as MSCIL 
by definition applies only to foreign investors while the use of the modal ‘may’ with reference 
to the protection accorded to domestic investors seems rather ambiguous. More importantly, it 
limits the protection to physical security and introduces a limitation to the related obligation 
to the available resources. Both treaty practice and arbitral awards vary significantly with 
regard to whether the obligation to ensure full protection goes beyond physical security.37 The 
standard protected under section 9 therefore cannot be considered as a departure from current 
practice, but rather a confirmation of a tendency to reduce it to physical security.38 
                                                        
 
36 Article 4 bis of the Protocol to the BIT with Iran, likewise, excludes the extension to 
investors of the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege resulting, inter alia, 
from: 
 
 any law or other measure taken, pursuant to Article (9) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108, 1996) the purpose of which is to promote the 
achievement of equality in its territory, or designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
 
37 See, in particular, J. K. Foster, ‘Recovering “protection and security”: the treaty 
standard’s obscure origins, forgotten meaning, and key current significance’, 45 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2012): 1095–156. 
38 See, for instance, Article 3.2 Indian model BIT, according to which ‘full protection and 
security only refers to a party’s obligations relating to the physical security of investors 
and to investments made by the investors of the other Party and not to any other 
obligation whatsoever.’ 
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Section 10 of the Act (Protection of property) – which is essentially a renvoi to section 
25 of the Constitution – does not reassure foreign investors. First of all, it deals only with 
direct expropriation, i.e. transfer of the title to property, and not also to indirect expropriation, 
which today is by far the most frequent form of deprivation of property.39 Second, it expressly 
imposes only three of the four requirements imposed by international law to lawfully 
expropriate foreign investment, namely public interest, respect of procedural rules and 
compensation. In line with the approach taken with regard to national treatment standards and 
right to regulate, mention is made to arbitrary measures but not to discriminatory measures. 
Furthermore, foreign investors may suffer the consequence of measures aimed at 
redressing past racial discrimination, realising land reform and promoting equitable access to 
all South Africa’s natural resources. These measures can be described as ‘positive 
discrimination’ and are certainly legitimate from a social and political standpoint. From a 
strictly legal perspective, however, section 10 calls for caution due to the vagueness and 
subjectivity of the just and equitable level of compensation, which reflects an equitable 
balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. This is definitely much 
less satisfactory, from the foreign investor’s standpoint, than the ‘prompt, full and adequate’ 
formula that can be found, in different variants, in the overwhelming majority of investment 
treaties.40 
If the substantive provisions of the Act can scarcely meet the level of protection 
normally offered by investment treaties, settlement via the dispute mechanism appears to be 
hardly satisfactory. Mediation is certainly to be encouraged for several reasons, including the 
higher probability to continue – if not to strengthen – the underlying business partnership as 
well as the flexibility it offers, especially with regard to expropriation, by allowing the parties 
                                                        
39 See, for instance, Article 4.1 of the BIT between South Africa and China. 
40 See, for example, Article 6.1 of the BIT between South Africa and Argentina. 
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to avoid the gamble of either getting full compensation or no compensation at all.41  By 
definition, however, its effectiveness depends on the concerned parties’ commitment and 
willingness to settle the dispute in a friendly manner. The exercise may be frustrated by the 
financial implications of the dispute or by political considerations and public pressure, 
especially when the dispute relates to investments in sensitive sectors. 
Leaving aside diplomatic protection, in the absence of an applicable treaty providing 
for international arbitration, foreign investors in South Africa may only have recourse 
domestic adjudicatory bodies which are not necessarily courts. The settlement of the dispute 
before domestic courts, tribunals or statutory bodies provided for in section 13.4 calls for 
several comments. To start with, the remedy in section 13.4 is independent from any attempt 
to settle the dispute through mediation. Besides, the verb ‘to approach’ used to describe the 
initiation of the proceeding under section 13.4 is not particularly felicitous. Perhaps more 
importantly, section 13.4 must be read in conjunction with section 6.4 (a fortiori considering 
that under section 6.4 the latter is subject to the former). However, it remains unclear what are 
the effects of the renvoi operated by section 6.4 to Article 34 of the Constitution, according to 
which the dispute could be settled by a court or, where appropriate, another independent and 
impartial tribunal or forum. 
The reference in section 6.4 to disputes ‘that can be resolved by the application of 
law’, moreover, remains rather cryptic and apparently assumes the existence of disputes that 
cannot be resolved by the application of law. This begs the question of what are the criteria to 
establish whether a dispute is susceptible to be settled by the application of law, who will 
make the related determination and what happens to disputes that cannot be settled by the 
application of the law. 
                                                        
41 See the symposium on ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in Investment Disputes’, 29 
ICSID Review (2014): 1. 
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Furthermore, the abandonment of investment–state arbitration is a rather drastic 
measure. Investment arbitration has been celebrated by numerous tribunals and in the 
literature as a remarkable development bringing the dispute outside the reach of politics with 
a view to ensuring the equalities of the parties in efficient proceedings conducted by 
independent tribunals.42 While there is no doubt that investment arbitration presents several 
problems,43 it remains to be seen whether the bald move backward made by the Act was 
indispensable or whether South Africa could have better calibrated the exposure of the host 
state (for instance, by restricting or conditioning access to arbitration, or by expressly 
introducing counter-claims) and enhance transparency, participation and public scrutiny. 
The settlement of disputes through state–state arbitration, which completes section 13, 
is hardly satisfactory, not only because it is entirely voluntary, but also because states are 
traditionally rather reluctant to resort to this kind of arbitration.44 Equally important, even 
assuming arbitration under section 13 is possible, the entire proceedings and all decisions 
related to the dispute (including a possibly friendly settlement or an agreement on 
compensation) will be firmly in the hand of the home state with all the associated 
shortcomings and implications. With regard to the proceedings, furthermore, the silence of the 
Act on the determination of the nationality of foreign investors unavoidably adds further 
uncertainty on the entire procedure. 
                                                        
42 See, for example, Gas Natural SDG v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/03/10, Jurisdiction, 17 
June 2005, paras 29 ff. 
43 See, in particular, M. Waibel, A. Kaushal, K.-H. L. Chung and C. Balchin (eds), The 
Backlash against Investment Arbitration (Kluwer, 2010); and J. Kalicki and A. Joubin-
Bret (eds), Reshaping the Investor–State Dispute Settlement System (Brill-Nijhoff, 
2015).  
44 See M. Potestà, ‘State-to-state dispute settlement pursuant to bilateral investment 
treaties: is there potential?’, in N. Boschiero et al. (eds), International Courts and the 
Development of International Law. Essays in Honour of T. Treves (Springer, 2013): 753. 
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IV. THE ACT AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The drastic move realised by the Act toward the protection of foreign investment through 
national legislation rather than international treaties requires a careful examination of the 
protection foreign investors may still expect under customary international law, keeping in 
mind, in addition to the Act itself, both Articles 232 and 233 of the Constitution.45 
Customary international law is relevant from four different, but intimately related, 
perspectives. In the first place, being law in South Africa in accordance with Article 232 of 
the Constitution, customary international law may become part of the applicable law, a 
fortiori when the Act refers to the relevant laws of the Republic, provided it is not inconsistent 
with the Constitution or an Act of the Parliament. Within these limits, for example, 
international customary rules may contribute alongside the Constitution and other relevant 
laws to the definition of the standard of treatment of foreign investors. 
Secondly, customary international law must be taken into account when interpreting 
both the Act and the Bill of Rights the Act relies upon under sections 3 and 4. On the one 
hand, the Act must be interpreted and applied in a manner that is consistent, inter alia, with 
customary international law (section 3(b)(ii)). On the other hand, under section 39 of the 
Constitution, in interpreting the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution the interpreter 
must consider international law. 
Thirdly, as provided in section 233 of the Constitution, domestic tribunals must prefer 
any reasonable interpretation of any legislation which is consistent with international law, 
which includes customary international law. This section mitigates the priority given to the 
                                                        
45 On the relationship between international customary law and the domestic legal system 
in South Africa, see J. Dugard, ‘International law and the South African Constitution’, 1 
European Journal of International Law (1997): 77–92. 
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Constitution or an Act of the Parliament over customary international law and ultimately aims 
at enhancing compliance by South Africa with its international legal commitments. 
Finally, section 9 of the Act directly refers to the minimum standard of customary 
international law as the benchmark of the level of physical security South Africa has to ensure 
for the investor, subject to available resources. 
All these provisions make customary international law almost ubiquitous in the 
interpretation and application of the Act. It may be expected that tension will arise when 
customary international law, on the one side, and the Act or other domestic legislation, on the 
other, cannot be accommodated through the interpretative process. 
It must be emphasised from the outset that the adoption of the Act does not affect in 
any way the international obligations of South Africa under customary international law. Few 
principles of international law are as well-established as the one precluding states from 
relying on domestic legislation to eschew their international obligations.46 It follows that, 
regardless of the adoption of the Act, South Africa is and remains bound to comply fully with 
customary international law.  
The two provisions most likely to pose problems are section 6 (Fair administrative 
treatment) and section 10 (Legal protection of investment). As noted above, section 6 departs 
from the international standards applied in investment law, namely the conventional fair and 
equitable treatment and the customary international minimum standard, in favour of an 
essentially domestic standard. Under section 6, South Africa is expressly required to refrain 
from operating arbitrarily in ‘administrative, legislative and judicial processes’ and not to 
deny administrative and procedural justice. The text lacks precision. The use of undefined 
                                                        
46 Among many examples, see Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, PCIJ 
Series A, No. 24, p. 12 (1930). 
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expressions such as ‘administrative, legislative and judicial processes’ and reference to such a 
broad notion as ‘justice’ may prove difficult to interpret and apply. 
From the standpoint of the foreign investor, the omission of any reference to non-
discrimination may be rather disappointing. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent 
South African competent authorities and tribunals charged with implementing the Act and 
settling the related disputes will consider non-discrimination as part of the fair administrative 
treatment, possibly finding guidance from investment awards and the practice of human rights 
treaties ratified by South Africa and most importantly the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights. The challenge – as is often the 
case in foreign investment law – is to weigh the legal protection of foreign investors against 
the rights and duties of the host states to pursue their public policies as well as the interests of 
other stakeholders.  
With regard to section 10, two challenging questions may be expected to arise and 
generate tension between the international obligations incumbent upon South Africa on the 
one hand and both the Act and the relevant domestic legislation on the other. The first relates 
to claims of discriminatory expropriation as section 25 of the Constitution – to which section 
10 of the Act refers – expressly proscribes only arbitrary expropriation. Similarly to section 
6, the omission of any express reference to the non-discrimination requirement unavoidably 
creates uncertainty. 
The second question concerns indirect expropriation. It is now well established, as 
pointed out by several tribunals, that: 
 
[e]xpropriation [. . .] includes not only open deliberate and acknowledged taking of 
property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of 
the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which 
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has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or 
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the 
obvious benefit of the host State.47 
 
It appears that section 25 of the Constitution, to which section 10 of the Act refers, is not 
sufficiently clear with regard to what amounts to indirect expropriation and what the 
consequences of indirect expropriation are. It introduces a distinction between ‘deprivation’ 
and ‘expropriation’. The former corresponds in good substance to or at least includes indirect 
expropriation. According to the South Africa Constitutional Court: 
 
the taking away of property is not required for a deprivation of property to occur. 
Whether there has been a deprivation depends on the extent of the interference with or 
limitation of use, enjoyment or exploitation. It is not necessary in this case to 
determine precisely what constitutes deprivation. No more need be said than that at the 
very least, substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal 
restrictions on property use or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society 
would amount to deprivation.48 
 
                                                        
47 Metalclad v. Mexico, ICSID ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000, para. 103. 
48 Mkontwana v. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another, Case CCT 
57/03, 6 October 2004, at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2004/9.pdf, para. 32 
(footnote omitted), the South Africa Constitutional Court, relying on First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v. Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another, Case CCT 19/01, 16 May 2002, at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/5.pdf, para. 57.  
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Importantly, deprivation does not trigger any obligation to compensate. In Agri South Africa 
v. Minister for Minerals and Energy, the South Africa Constitutional Court held that: 
 
[d]eprivation within the context of section 25 includes extinguishing a right previously 
enjoyed, and expropriation is a subset thereof. Whereas deprivation always takes place 
when property or rights therein are either taken away or significantly interfered with, 
the same is not necessarily true of expropriation. Deprivation relates to sacrifices that 
holders of private property rights may have to make without compensation, whereas 
expropriation entails state acquisition of that property in the public interest and must 
always be accompanied by compensation.49 
 
Conversely, compensation is due only in case of expropriation, which apparently presupposes 
a transfer of the title to property. As pointed out by the Constitutional Court, ‘[t]here can be 
no expropriation in circumstances where deprivation does not result in property being 
acquired by the state.’50 
It may be provisionally concluded that, whatever the righteousness of the measures 
depriving foreign investors of the enjoyment of their investments, the Act does not provide 
adequate protection against expropriation.51 Given the text of section 25 of the Constitution, 
                                                        
49 Agri South Africa v. Minister for Minerals and Energy, Case CCT 51/12[2013] ZACC 9, 
18 April 2013, at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2013/9.html, para. 48 (footnotes 
omitted, emphasis added). 
50 Ibid., para. 59, relying on Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v. MEC for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government and Another, Case CCT 110/08, 
[2009] ZACC 24, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2009/24.pdf, para. 64. 
51 In the same sense, see S. Woolfrey, ‘The emergence of a new approach to investment 
protection in South Africa’, in S. Hindelang and M. Krajewski (eds), Shifting Paradigm 
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the status of customary international law in the domestic legal system and the jurisprudence of 
the Constitutional Court, it may be expected that customary international law will have little 
impact on domestic proceedings. This unavoidably affects the protection foreign investors are 
entitled to under customary international law and exposes South Africa to the risk of not 
complying with the related obligations. 
 
V. THE ACT AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
The Act has to be considered also with regard to the impact or potential impact on BITs 
currently applicable to South Africa. Keeping in mind the significant lower level of legal 
protection granted to foreign investors under the Act compared to that normally provided in 
these treaties, the question is worth exploring from three different perspectives. 
In the first place, several of the BITs binding South Africa contain preservation of 
rights clauses ensuring, inter alia, that legislation – existing at the time of the conclusion of 
the treaty or adopted subsequently – that is more favourable to the foreign investor would 
prevail over an inconsistent treaty provisions. The ratio of these clauses is quite 
straightforward: to ensure that the treaty does not deprive foreign investors of the better 
protection they may be entitled to under domestic legislation. 
It remains to be seen whether these clauses could be interpreted as providing foreign 
investors with a shield against legislation that could unfavourably affect the treatment they are 
entitled to under the relevant BIT. It can be argued that a contrario and teleological 
arguments pave the way to a plausible interpretation of these clauses in the sense of 
neutralising legislation existing at the time of the conclusion of the treaty or adopted 
subsequently that would detract from the rights protected under the treaty. From this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in International Investment Law. More Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly 
Diversified (Oxford University Press, 2016): Chapter XI. 
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perspective, the fact that these clauses expressly provide for the application of more 
favourable provisions of domestic legislation may be read as implying than provisions having 
the opposite effect do not apply.52 This interpretation may be even more convincing when the 
relevant clause refers to the application to foreign investors of domestic legislation ‘to the 
extent’ it is more favourable to them, as in the case of the BITs with Nigeria or Finland.53 It 
remains to be seen whether domestic courts or arbitral tribunals will share this interpretation. 
The major obstacle for such an interpretation lies in the fact that while the priority given to 
legislation more favourable to investors over the relevant treaty provisions is perfectly 
respectful of the sovereignty of the host state, neutralising legislation less favourable to 
investors affects the regulatory powers of that state and amounts to a form of ‘immunity’ from 
subsequent legislation reminiscent of that offered by stabilisation clauses. 
The second perspective relates to litigation before domestic tribunals, which is 
expressly provided for in most – but not all54 – BITs currently applicable to South Africa, 
sometimes within fork-in-the-road provisions.55 Considering the distinct advantages normally 
offered by international arbitration,56 it may be expected that foreign investors in South Africa 
                                                        
52 According to A. Newcombe and L. Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties. 
Standards of Treatment (Kluwer, 2009): 478, a preservation of rights clause ‘simply 
says that in applying and enforcing the existing protection offered by the [treaty], 
attention should be paid to any favourable, but not unfavourable, provision contained in 
domestic law.’ 
53 In both cases Article 11(1). 
54 Article 8(2) of the BIT with Nigeria is silent on domestic remedies. 
55 See Article 8(2) of the BIT with the Czech Republic (not in force yet). Article 12(3) of 
the BIT with Iran reads: ‘National courts shall not have jurisdiction over any dispute 
referred to Arbitration.’ 
56 See supra, note 42. 
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may be less than enthusiastic about having recourse to domestic tribunals, especially with the 
presence of fork-in-the-road clauses.  
Should disputes concerning alleged violations of BITs reach domestic courts, several 
questions may arise with regard to both the status of the treaty and its coordination with the 
Act.57 Under the Constitution, a treaty is binding for South Africa only after being approved 
by the Parliament, with the exception of technical, administrative and executive agreements 
(section 231(2) and (3) of the Constitution). 58  It becomes law in South Africa through 
incorporation and possesses the same status as the act incorporating it.59 
The status of international treaties in the domestic legal system of South Africa under 
the 1996 Constitution, however, is still not entirely clear. One author has even argued that 
‘[t]he South African court decisions over the years have [. . .] fuelled debate rather than 
                                                        
57 On the relationship between international law and domestic law in South Africa, see, in 
particular, E. de Wet, ‘South Africa’, in D. Sloss (ed.), The Role of Domestic Courts in 
Treaty Enforcement. A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press, 2009): 567–93; 
J. Dugard, ‘South Africa’, in D. Shelton (ed.), International Law and Domestic Legal 
Systems (Oxford University Press, 2011): 448–75; C. Gowar, ‘The status of 
international treaties in the South African domestic legal system: small steps towards 
harmony in light of Glenister?’, 36 South African Yearbook of International 
Law (2011): 307–25. 
58 An agreement can be considered as technical, administrative and executive if it 
cumulatively satisfies the following criteria: (a) is departmentally specific; (b) does not 
have major political or other significance; (c) has no financial consequences; and (d) 
does not affect domestic law. See the opinion on the Economic Assistance Agreement 
between South Africa and Cuba rendered by the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser 
on 11 November 2011, at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/120808dojcd.pdf, relying on section 5(5) of the Manual on 
Executive Acts of the President of the Republic of South Africa (2006).  
59 See Dugard, supra, note 57, p. 463. 
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provided clarity as to the status of international treaties should it conflict with domestic 
law.’60 
With regard to BITs, furthermore, it is doubtful that these treaties can be considered as 
technical, administrative and executive agreements, for which no ratification or incorporation 
is necessary. Such a qualification may be precluded by the political and economic 
significance of these treaties as well as their financial consequences. Treaty practice of South 
Africa in this regard seems inconclusive.61 
It is therefore necessary to double check (a) whether the relevant BIT has been enacted 
into law by national legislation, thus becoming law in South Africa applicable by domestic 
judges in accordance with section 231(4) of the Constitution; and (b) the status of the act 
incorporating the treaty. It is, however, possible that certain provisions contained in BITs are 
self-executing and as such become law in South Africa, provided that the BIT has been 
approved by the Parliament and the provisions are not inconsistent with the Constitution or an 
Act of Parliament (section 233 of the Constitution). 
Depending on the outcome of these preliminary questions, domestic tribunals may be 
able to settle disputes concerning allegations of violations of the relevant BIT. Should this be 
the case, they will presumably apply the relevant BIT as well as the Protection of Investment 
Act and other relevant legislation. South African tribunals are directed under section 233 of 
the Constitution to search for any reasonable interpretation of the Act which is consistent with 
international law, which includes the BITs and customary international law.  
It cannot be excluded that an insurmountable conflict may arise between provisions of 
the Act and a treaty, most prominently in relation to fair administrative treatment and 
                                                        
60 E. Lai King, ‘The Impact of International Developments’, February 2015, at 
http://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/the-impact-of-international-developments.  
61 On this point, see Schlemmer, supra, note 7, at p. 170. 
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expropriation (including compensation). If the treaty has been enacted by subordinate 
legislation or the treaty provision is applicable due to its self-executing nature, the Act will 
prevail. But if the treaty has been enacted by act of Parliament, it enjoys the same legal status 
of the Act and it is difficult to predict how a domestic tribunal would decide. Yet, they must 
keep in mind that solving the conflict in favour of the Act may amount to non-compliance 
with the international obligations of South Africa and engage its international responsibility. 
The third perspective concerns the possible impact of the Act on international 
arbitration related to alleged violations of BITs. Several existing BITs expressly include 
domestic law in the law applicable to the arbitral proceedings,62 whereas the BIT with Iran 
rather unusually directs the arbitral tribunal to have ‘due regard’ to the host state laws and 
regulations.63 
It is now generally accepted, especially when the treaty indicates domestic law as part 
of the applicable law, that both international law and domestic law have a role to play in 
investment arbitration. As forcefully pointed out by a tribunal with regard to Article 42 of the 
ICSID Convention, ‘[t]he law of the host State can indeed be applied in conjunction with 
international law if this is justified. So too international law can be applied by itself if the 
appropriate rule is found in this other ambit.’64 
While several tribunals have emphasised the ‘complementary relationship’ (‘rapport 
de complémentarité’)65 or ‘close interaction’66 between international and domestic rules, in 
                                                        
62 See, for instance, Article 8(4) of the BIT with Nigeria, Article 9(6) of the BIT with 
China and Article 9(4) of the BIT with Argentina. Article 9(4) of the BIT with Greece, 
on the contrary, does not include domestic law within the applicable law.  
63 Article 12(2). 
64 Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID ARB/98/4, Annulment, 5 February 2002, para. 40. 
65 Antoine Goetz et consorts v. Burundi, ICSID ARB/95/3, Award, 10 February 1999, para. 
98. 
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the case of unsurmountable conflict between the two in the context of proceedings related to 
treaty claims international rules are expected to prevail, either by virtue of the international 
nature of the claim or the professed superiority of international rules.67 
Yet, foreign investors must be aware that investment tribunals might consider and, if 
appropriate, apply the Act, especially when domestic law is expressly indicated in the relevant 
treaty as applicable law. From this perspective, the Act will be ‘not an incidental part of the 
factual background, but an integrated part of the applicable law’.68 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
66 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, para. 
117. 
67  In LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. 
Argentina, ICSID ARB/02/1, Liability, 3 October 2006, para. 94, for instance, the 
Tribunal held that ‘international law overrides domestic law when there is a 
contradiction since a State cannot justify non-compliance of its international obligations 
by asserting the provisions of its domestic law.’ In a more nuanced fashion, in Duke 
Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Ecuador, ICSID ARB/04/19, Award, 
18 August 2008, para. 441, the Tribunal found that ‘[t]he question is not about the pre-
eminence of one rule over the other but about applying the relevant rule depending on 
the type of norm that has been breached. It is the Tribunal’s task to identify the specific 
rules that dictate the consequences for each of these breaches.’ For a full account of the 
relevant decisions, see H. E. Kjos, Applicable Law in Investor–State Arbitration: The 
Interplay Between National and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), 
especially Chapter 6. See also C. Schreuer, ‘Jurisdiction and applicable law in 
investment treaty arbitration, 1 McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution (2014): 1–25. 
68 I. Alvik, ‘The hybrid nature of investment treaty arbitration – straddling the 
national/international divide’, in C. C. Eriksen and M. Emberland (eds), The New 
International Law: An Anthology (Nijhoff, 2010): 89, at 95. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
With the 2015 Protection Investment Act, the pendulum of the rights and obligations in the 
field of foreign investment has swung decisively in favour of the state. Balancing private and 
public rights and obligations is more than legitimate, as is switching from international 
treaties to domestic legislation. What is not convincing is the necessity of the drastic 
reduction of foreign investors’ substantive and procedural rights realised by the Act. It is 
argued that a better equilibrium could have been achieved by adjusting the existing level of 
legal protection for foreign investors, either by amending or even renegotiating existing 
treaties, or by the adoption of domestic legislation properly protecting the interest of foreign 
investors while preserving the capacity of South Africa to fully exercise its sovereign 
prerogatives. 
South Africa could have reconsidered and possibly limited the rights of foreign 
investors as well as introduced obligations upon them, including social and environmental 
impact assessment, corporate social responsibility, consultation, transparency, prohibition of 
corruption, access to information and documents, and so on. The SADC model BIT and the 
recent Indian model BIT as well as some modern investment treaties69 could have been useful 
sources of inspiration. 
The right to regulate certainly deserves to be adequately safeguarded, with carefully 
drafted specific or general exceptions, possibly modelled after Article XX GATT, rather than 
vague and politically charged provisions such as those appearing in the Act. Besides, existing 
provisions especially designed to allow the adoption by South Africa of the measures 
necessary to redress past discrimination and injustices70 could have been further developed.  
                                                        
69 See supra, note 15. 
70 See supra, note 36. 
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Moreover, wiping out investor–state arbitration may prove unnecessary if not 
counterproductive. A variety of options are available between keeping the existing regime and 
its flat rejection. The current concerns over the legal protection of foreign investment could 
indeed be addressed by introducing appropriate provisions on the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, fork-in-the-road clauses, transparency, access to documents, counterclaims – if not 
even claims put forward by states against investors – and so on. 
It remains now to be seen what impact the Act will have upon the flow of foreign 
investment to South Africa. Such assessment is particularly arduous for several reasons, 
including the difficulties in establishing a link between the Act and the evolution of the flow 
of foreign investment and discharging changes in such flow due to other endogenous and 
exogenous causes.71 Meanwhile, foreign investors might be advised on the complex issued 
raised by the adoption of the Act with regard to the protection they are entitled to under 
domestic law as well as under customary international law and the BITs currently applicable.  
                                                        
71 According to UNCTAD, ‘FDI into South Africa, by contrast, decreased markedly by 69 
per cent to $1.8 billion – the lowest level in ten years – owing to factors such as 
lacklustre economic performance, lower commodity prices and higher electricity costs’ 
(UNCTAD Report 2016, p. 41).  
